The U.S. Digital Trade Agenda: Contents and Applications
In August of last year, U.S. Congress enacted the "Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002"
1 . Thereby it has ended an eight year period in which the United States lacked the fast-track authority to conclude trade agreements with a simplified congressional ratification procedure 2 . President BUSH's intention is to use the new Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to pursue a parallel track of preferential and multilateral trade negotiations.
3 This is a reaction to the fact that during the lack of fast-track authority American policy-makers increasingly worried that the U.S. has been losing out in the race for preferential trade agreements. 4 Thus, in parallel to the ongoing Doha negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the TPA that is barely six months old has already provided Aussenwirtschaft, 58. Jahrgang (2003) (downloaded February 25, 2003) . 4 See HUBBARD (2002) REPRESENTATIVES (2001b) . Often this small number of U.S. preferential agreements is contrasted to the EC (European Communities) that is party to around 30 preferential trade agreements.
software or movies that derive their value from "content" produced by the information technology (IT) and entertainment industries, and that were previously -in the offline world -delivered on physical carrier media like CDs. 13 Although this comment concentrates on the negotiations relevant to digital products, the U.S. digital trade policy also targets the trade liberalization of other services that can be delivered across borders electronically (e.g. financial or architectural services). Most of these rules and trade concessions go beyond the current state-of-the-art rules or commitment levels in the WTO ("GATS-plus", "TRIPS-plus", etc.).
This ambitious digital trade agenda originates from the fact that within the last couple of years a powerful alliance of American business associations that represent high-tech firms (e.g. Information Technology Industry Council) and associations that represent classical content producing firms (e.g. Motion Picture Association of America) has joined forces to voice its interests in avoiding the rise of new digital trade barriers. Apart from lucrative and bipartisan campaign contributions from these industries 14 , the reasons for their congressional support are their past contribution to American growth and employment 15 , and the strong comparative advantage of the U.S. in the trade of service in general and IT (especially software), entertainment products and activities related to royalties and license fees in particular 16 .
In its non-trade related legislation the U.S. Congress has thus followed the industry's advice that e-commerce, and digital trade of content in particular, will thrive best with a strong intellectual property regime 17 and little government interference in other regulatory matters.
18 But domestic U.S. legislation, like the 1998 Internet Tax Freedom Act, also called for actions to minimize the rise of barriers to e-commerce in international trade negotiation fora like the WTO. 19 Since then e-commerce and the liberalization of digital trade products have been a top negotiation priority of the BUSH administration. 20 Throughout the tough congressional negotiations leading to the TPA the strong mandate for digital trade was actually one of the few trade topics where unconditional bipartisan support existed. It is also an item that will be monitored closely by the newly founded Congressional Oversight Group that was built to ensure an unseen congressional involvement during trade negotiations 21 .
The comprehensive bundle of negotiation objectives that the U.S. negotiators aim for in bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations are displayed in Table 1 . The wide spectrum of all the different areas addressed here hints at the complexity of pursuing free digital trade. This complexity mainly arises from the fact that digital trade flows transcend the legal borders that have traditionally been erected between trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related aspects of IPR protection in the existing and especially the multilateral trade agreements. (ITA) , that the ITA product coverage is extended, and that non-tariff trade barriers to IT goods are reduced or eliminated. For digital products delivered on physical carrier media trade partners shall agree to base customs duties on the value of the carrier media rather than the content.
Digital Service Ensure that, when possible, the most liberal form to schedule trade Trade commitments (negative list approach) is used so that new services (focus on are automatically covered by old commitments, and ensure the abEntertainment, sence of discrimination against electronic service delivery.
Telecom and IT)
Audiovisual Services: (A) Trade partners are not asked to dismantle existing financial support schemes for culture and content-production. The U.S. only requests the elimination of very trade-distorting subsidies and other financial support schemes. (B) Trade partners are not asked to eliminate existing regulations that discriminate against foreign content and that usually apply to traditional technologies like broadcasting or the cinema. Rather trade partners are asked to schedule their existing audiovisual regulations and thus freeze them at a particular level (50 % local broadcasting content quota, for instance). (C) The U.S. is requesting commitments on new audiovisual services like video-on-demand, new forms of content distribution, etc.
Telecommunication Services and Computer and Related Services
(A Deepen and broaden the commitments for basic telecommunications, for value-added telecommunications (like online information services, database retrieval, etc.) and for computer and related services. Ensure that evolving IT products (incl. entertainment games and software) are covered by these commitments.
Other Service Sectors that can be delivered electronically across borders (A) Deepen and broaden the commitments for the cross-border trade in financial, business, professional and other services. Some of the elements of the U.S. digital trade agenda can only be understood in the context of questions (e.g., correct classification and other elements of a predictable digital trade framework, etc.) that were actually first raised on the multilateral level in 1999 by the "WTO Work Program on E-commerce" and the ensuing U.S. desire to maintain the usually high degree of market access for content delivered on physical carrier media also for content delivered electronically. 22 The open WTO e-commerce questions are still whether the multilateral temporary duty-free moratorium on all digital transactions that has been temporarily agreed on in the WTO in 1998 can be made permanent, and which rules and commitments should apply to digitally delivered content. Uncertainty arose on whether products delivered in digital form should be treated as goods (GATT-like treatment) or as services (GATS-like treatment). Even if considered under the GATS, WTO Members must also agree under what GATS commitments in the different categories of "value-added telecommunication", "audiovisual services" or "computer and related services" digital content falls.
These classification issues and the decision on the moratorium on electronic transactions obviously have a very tangible effect on the applicable degree of trade liberalization. Whereas in the multilateral trading system physical carrier media under the GATT are subject to only few or -if the WTO Member is a signatory to the Information Technology Agreementno customs duties or import quotas, the same content can face severe market access barriers or even absent trade commitments altogether when classified under the GATS "audiovisual services" category. 23 Especially, the U.S. software industry is not ready to face a "reclassification" of their products, the ensuing GATS treatment and the potential audiovisual exemptions (i.e. entertainment games) when selling their products online. 24 Most importantly, it is this classification debate that introduces the link between a rather technical categorization question and the outright refusal of many WTO Member States to liberalize cultural and especially audiovisual services (the so-called desire for the "exception culturel-le" 25 ). This link may appear innocent at first sight. But its dimension becomes clear when considering that the ambition of many WTO Members to maintain absolute policy flexibility with respect to audiovisual services has nearly been a stumbling block to the whole Uruguay Round.
26
In the light of these unresolved questions the U.S. digital trade policy as shown in Table 1 has four sub-strategies:
(i) To make sure that WTO principles and commitments apply to e-commerce and to resolve the classification issues in the most liberal way for digital trade 27 : When asking for current obligations and rules of the WTO to apply to e-commerce the U.S. wants to counter the idea of some WTO Member States that their current commitments and the rules of the WTO Treaties may not apply to electronic transactions. 28 Given that for movies and other digital products commitments in the GATT are almost always greater than commitments in the GATS, the most liberal trade approach to the classification questions is a more elegant way of asking not to submit digital products to the market access and national treatment limitations entered for audiovisual services. For understandable reasons, this point (i) on classification issues and the point on additional cross-border commitments in audiovisual services of the subsequent point (ii) are, however, rarely seen together in communications of the U.S. to the WTO.
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( 33 and the duty-free ecommerce moratorium, the U.S. wants to make sure that -no matter if goods or services -no tariffs are levied on digital products. To secure market access for products that are considered goods, the U.S. urges its trade partners to adhere to the ITA. It also requests members and non-members to the ITA to levy duties on the value of the carrier media in the context of the ITA rather than on the usually much higher value of the content 34 . The U.S. also works for the extension of the ITA product coverage and the reduction of non-tariff barriers (i.e. technical regulations and conformity measures) to IT products. When it comes to more specific commitments in the field of services the U.S. suggests the most liberal form of scheduling (negative list approach 35 ) and interpretation with respect to standing commitments. Regarding specific commitments the U.S. has learned its lesson from the Uruguay Round when approaching the issue of audiovisual service trade liberalization. 36 The USTR's new strategy has evolved from asking for an elimination of all discriminatory market access barriers to requests that U.S. trade partners should "freeze" their current level of discriminatory audiovisual regulations in their
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31 GATS schedule or other preferential service agreements. 37 With this negotiation objective, the USTR is seeking a binding of access that is already provided and, thus, to ensure a predictable trade framework for U.S. entertainment industries. Furthermore, the U.S. -increasingly displaying an understanding of the value of cultural diversitywill not be asking their trade partners to eliminate most of their financial support schemes (like subsidies) that usually violate the national treatment principle.
38 Whenever possible the U.S. is requesting commitments on many new electronically delivered audiovisual services that are very different from traditional broadcasting (video-ondemand, etc.). Although the requests look innocent as compared to requests for full market access that was asked for during the Uruguay Round, there is a catch to these U.S. requests. As contemporary audiovisual regulations usually do not already address new digital content delivery services, a "freezing" of all existing regulations basically has the effect of limiting changes in existing discriminatory audiovisual regulations (except of course a reduction in their discriminatory scope) and of limiting the creation of future discriminatory regulations that policy-makers feel may be necessary in the online and non-broadcasting environment. 39 The latter effect of guaranteeing that "audiovisual protectionism" stays aloof of digital products delivered via new trade media re-establishes the link between audiovisual negotiations and the U.S. digital trade policy. However, the American intention not to ask for the elimination of subsidy schemes would also mean that content for electronic networks like the Internet can be subsidized or supported in other forms. The U.S. requests for full commitments to telecommunication and computer services are less politically sensitive and thus more straightforward. Together with the strategy adopted with respect to classification issues the U.S. thus either secures GATT or favorable GATS treatment for software and IT services. When U.S. negotiators stress that "all" software services should be covered by computer service commitments this is an indirect appeal to resist any tempta-tion to extend audiovisual exemptions to software that contains music or video sequences. The same straightforward approach to elimination of limitations to market access and national treatment also applies to the other electronically deliverable sectors (i.e. business, professional, financial services) 40 .
(iii) To create a regulatory trade discipline for e-commerce 41 : The U.S. desire for a regulatory discipline for e-commerce derives from the fact that the increasing national regulatory patchworks that target digital trade and the originally "borderless" electronic networks in general are felt to have a negative impact on the development of global electronic trade flows. 42 In line with the U.S. domestic "hands-off approach" to the regulation of e-commerce, the American request for regulatory forbearance and transparency intends to limit the number of trade-related e-commerce measures. 43 In cases where regulatory action by trade partners is warranted the proposed regulatory discipline suggests a necessity and proportionality test for these regulations that is well-known in the WTO for regulations that apply to goods. 44 The U.S. is also particularly interested in getting a commitment on the free flow of information.
45 Interestingly, the USTR has so far rejected such a "least-trade restrictive approach" in negotiations concerning the mandated development of a regulatory discipline in the GATS that would apply horizontally to all service sectors. 46 Apart from this regulatory discipline for digital trade the U.S. wants to avoid any content-related discussion or integration of regu-latory digital trade standards in the WTO framework (i.e. integration of a clause on data protection in a potential WTO e-commerce chapter).
(iv) To update trade agreements so that new treaties deal with trade-related
aspects of intellectual property protection in the digital trade age 48 : Finally, the digital trade agenda recognizes that intellectual property disciplines (especially copyright and related rights) are jeopardized by the emergence of the Internet and electronic commerce.
49 Two problems are most pressing: on the one hand, in the digital age the enforcement of IPRs that all WTO members have subscribed to while adhering to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is a real challenge to both industrialized and developing WTO members. 50 On the other hand, the TRIPS still only derives its main content by making reference to treaties 51 of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) that were concluded before the Uruguay Round. Meanwhile the WIPO and its Member States have followed a modernization development that in 1996 led to the two so-called "WIPO Internet treaties": the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) that both entered into force in 2002. 52 Issues addressed in these treaties are the definition and scope of copyrights, greater precision on what constitutes infringement and reproduction of works in digital form, more clarity on the extent of the rightholders' control when works are on the Internet, etc. 53 The final element of the U.S. digital trade policy is the negotiation objective that trade partners should ratify the two new WIPO treaties and that these new obligations shall be linked to existing or new trade agree-
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Sacha Wunsch-Vincent 47 Thereby any legitimization of trade barriers of this sort shall be avoided in the WTO framework. It is however a standard procedure within the WTO not to address the particular content of regulation but only to subject regulations that pursue legitimate policy objectives to a regulatory discipline. 48 ments. 54 At times the U.S. will also ask for country-specific improvements of IPR laws. To conclude, a link between future agreements that result from the very dynamic digital agenda of the WIPO and the WTO must be envisaged by all WTO Member States. 55 U.S. negotiators have chosen a concurrent bilateral, regional and multilateral approach to the above-mentioned digital trade objectives. As will be seen in Part 2 on the multilateral negotiations and Part 3 on the first bilateral and regional efforts in this field, the U.S. negotiators have different expectations and, thus, negotiation objectives in the different negotiation fora. In other words, not the full spectrum of the objectives of Table 1 are necessarily advanced in all negotiation fora. Whereas progress on the U.S. digital trade agenda described in Table 1 is, at the moment, difficult to achieve on the multilateral level, U.S. negotiators have achieved some first notable successes with regard to their digital trade objectives in the first two bilateral agreements resulting from the TPA (U.S.-Chile/U.S.-Singapore). It is argued that -without losing sight of the WTO negotiations -these bilateral digital trade frameworks will serve as a template for further U.S. preferential trade talks.
The Multilateral Doha Negotiations:
A Difficult Environment for the U.S. Digital Trade Agenda
The implementation of U.S. negotiation objectives with respect to digital trade are difficult to implement swiftly on the multilateral level. In factdespite of the launch of the WTO E-commerce Work Program in 1998 -none of the U.S. negotiation objectives listed in Table 1 have yet been satisfactorily met in the WTO.
Apart from the cultural exemption debate concerning digital products 56 that has lead to a deadlock in the WTO E-commerce Work Program, one
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54 Table 1 : Points (C) and (D) in the section on Intellectual Property Protection in the Digital Age. As via the Digital Millennium Copyright Act the U.S. has updated its laws on IPRs in line with the new WIPO treaties in 1996. Point (B) in the same section indirectly specifies the same requests on U.S. trade partners. 55 In fact, the WIPO has its own "WIPO Digital Agenda" that continually evolves. Thus, for instance, the WIPO currently promotes the adjustment of the international legislative framework to facilitate ecommerce through the extension of the principles of the WPPT to audiovisual performances, the adaptation of broadcasters' rights to the digital era, progress towards a possible international instrument on the protection of databases, and to improve the work of the WIPO on the Internet Domain Name Process. Moreover, it currently plans a "World Summit On Intellectual Property and the Knowledge Economy" in Beijing from April 24 to 26, 2003. 56 Should digital products fall under the GATS or the GATT? of the more important reasons for this lack of process is an institutional one. On the multilateral level, it is difficult to negotiate digital trade issues that transcend standing institutional and legal boundaries that have been erected in the WTO context in a bundled and coherent fashion. Therefore it is, for example, difficult to find institutional room for agreements like an e-commerce chapter applicable across goods and services. In general, innovation in the WTO is complicated by the facts that in the WTO rule-making takes a long time and that few Member States are ready to re-open existing rules and obligations for renewed negotiations. 57 Furthermore, a bundled and timely approach is difficult because the different trade topics (ITA, TRIPS, etc.) all have their own negotiation agenda. In fact, the Doha Development Agenda -the first opportunity where elements of the digital trade agenda may be successfully negotiated -only started in 2001. Even if negotiations in the relevant areas proceed satisfactorily for the U.S., rules and commitments will only be effective if and when the whole WTO round is successfully concluded.
58 Without doubt, digital trade issues do not figure prominently in the overall Doha Agenda.
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Its complex other priorities and the current gridlock on agriculture and TRIPS and Health issues will take much of the negotiators' attention. 60 Formally, a negotiation agenda on digital trade issues does not even exist in the WTO. Apart from above reasons this can also be explained by the fact that the very heterogeneous WTO membership has a varying degree of interest in rules and obligations concerning digital trade.
Clearly, this does not mean that no progress will be made on the multilateral front. After all, one of the reasons for the absent agreements of issues listed in Table 1 is that most of the Doha negotiations only recently got started, and that openings for digital trade negotiations must be found in the process. It simply means that in the WTO only small parts of the U.S. digital trade agenda will be met in the medium run (2005 or later), and that some issues may not be negotiated on the multilateral level at all. The below paragraphs outline where decisions are unlikely to be taken anytime soon, and where the digital trade agenda can be advanced. When it comes to decisions that fall outside the scope of the regular Doha negotiations -basically, the points in the E-commerce/Trade in Digital Products section in Table 1 -the following can be concluded: although the WTO E-Commerce Work Program perfectly rose to the challenge of identifying the need for action and opening questions in 1999 its status as working and non-negotiation group did not enable it to make the necessary decisions on whether trade rules apply to digital trade or where digital products were to be classified. The logjam in the WTO E-commerce Work Program is well-reflected in the Doha mandate's paragraph on ecommerce that only instructs the General Council to rethink institutional arrangements until September 2003. 62 Specifically, not even a formal decision on the applicability of WTO rules and obligations to digital trade has been taken by the WTO Member States. 63 Although the duty-free moratorium on e-commerce has been extended in 2001, it will elapse again during this year's Fifth Ministerial Meeting in Cancun. 64 Developing countries are still weary to concede to this potential tariff loss before getting something in return which is of greater perceived relevance to them.
65 Also, until the classification debates are solved many WTO Member States will not agree to the permanence of this moratorium.
Unfortunately, it is just this long-standing debate on digital product classification that has stalled the WTO's work on a digital trade agenda.
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WTO Member States like the EC and Canada maintain that digital products should be classified as services and see the U.S. proposals to afford GATT treatment to digital products as an attempt to circumvent the cul- tural exemption. 67 Although not addressed directly by the EC the classification under the GATS would in turn allow the WTO Member States to extend their practice of discriminatory limitations and cultural support measures to audiovisual services delivered online. 68 The issue of a regulatory discipline for e-commerce mandated in the U.S. TPA and a firm commitment to acknowledge the importance of free information flows also fall prey to "cultural" issues in WTO. Whereas in principle the U.S. wants to introduce their regulatory hands-off approach on the multilateral level, in the meantime other WTO Member States have introduced domestic legislation that applies to electronic networks (e.g. data or consumer protection) that they do not want to see curtailed by WTO obligations. After all, the interest of U.S. Congress in such a regulatory e-commerce discipline was particularly spurred by two directives of the European Communities -one on data privacy and the other one on online value-added tax on digital products -that are considered harmful to digital transatlantic trade in the U.S. 69 Obviously, countries like the EC will not want to compromise on this type of legislation without making sure that issues like data privacy are addressed in a potential WTO ecommerce chapter. 70 The latter intake of such more content-related "regulatory barriers" into the multilateral framework, however, is a nonstarter for the U.S.
All in all, the digital trade-specific objectives of Table 1 (regulatory ecommerce discipline, a permanent e-commerce moratorium or the most trade liberal treatment of digital products) are unlikely to be achieved by the U.S. anytime soon in the WTO. Specifically, the U.S. has not even started formal requests in the WTO that would pave the way for a sub-
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Sacha Wunsch-Vincent 67 The EC's stance that digital products are services must also be understood in the light of the fact that these products are classified as services internally (so-called "information society services"). Another reason is that in EC law most regulations that the lawmakers want to apply to online transactions are based on the notion that sales of digital products are service transactions. 68 At this point it must also be emphasized that the European media and IT industry either has different interests than the U.S. industry or that it fails to effectively communicate its business interests to the EC negotiators in Brussels. 69 One directive on data privacy prevented the outflow of data from the EC to third countries that have no comparable data protection level ( February 14, 2002, Vol. 19, No. 7 . 70 Also one may wonder why the U.S. is ready to introduce language on least-trade restrictiveness for digital trade whereas in the discussion for the horizontal GATS regulatory discipline the U.S. negotiators have shunned such an approach.
stantial discussion of an e-commerce chapter that in turn would entail above elements. In fact, in Cancun U.S. negotiators may well focus only on obtaining another temporary duty-free moratorium on electronic transactions and positive statement from the WTO about the importance of free-trade principles and rules to the development of global e-commerce. 71 As a matter of fact, it is also quite unclear how the General Council will decide on how to proceed with the WTO E-commerce Work Program.
The United States is actively engaged in the work program on electronic commerce, now being conducted under the auspices of the WTO's General Council. In 2002, two meetings were dedicated to e-commerce and focused on classification and fiscal implications of electronically transmitted products. As the work progresses, the U.S. will push for a set of objectives to form the basis for a positive statement from the WTO about the importance of free-trade principles and rules to the development of global e-commerce.
Due to the absence of an independent WTO E-Commerce Initiative and the deadlock in the WTO E-commerce Work Program 72 , the list of sophisticated trade objectives in Table 1 will now be pursued by the U.S. and other interested WTO Member States where the possibility arises in the market access negotiations on goods / services (mostly) during the current Doha round.
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(i) On the goods side the U.S. is likely to be able to use the current Doha negotiations to request accession to the ITA from non-members. 74 As the ITA currently encompasses only 56 out of 145 WTO Member States, scope for improvement exists. This would secure low or zero tariff treatment of digital content that comes on a physical media carrier and would extend the number of WTO countries thatif agreement is reached on a most trade liberal approach to digital products -may have to afford the same treatment to electronic transactions. Nevertheless, given the debate on the cultural exemp- shall continue to carry out an assessment of trade in services in overall terms and on a sectoral basis with reference to the objectives of the GATS and of Article IV in particular.
[…]" 81 Extract of the GATS Negotiation Guidelines: "Based on multilaterally agreed criteria, account shall be taken and credit shall be given in the negotiations for autonomous liberalization undertaken by Members since previous negotiations. Members shall endeavour to develop such criteria prior to the start of negotiation of specific commitments." 82 Further uncertainty results from the fact that the negotiations on GATS rule-making (subsidies, government procurement, safeguards, domestic regulations, etc.) that have been under way for years have not yet produced any result (see SAUVÉ 2002) . Member States are thus asked to make specific commitments without full clarity on the future GATS framework rules.
March 2003. But as opposed to the above-mentioned classification issues, real progress is to be expected with respect to better market access commitments in at least two of the three fields relevant to digital products: computer and telecommunication services. This also applies to financial, business or professional services that can be delivered electronically. The majority of commitments scheduled in the Uruguay Round were in fact "standstill bindings" and, at the time, even more advanced developing countries like Brazil and India only made minimal commitments. The low level of current commitments, the seemingly greater interest of developing countries in obtaining market access to other service markets, the fact that the Doha service negotiations can build on first concluded GATS negotiation guidelines and sectoral proposal decided upon before the start of the Doha negotiations 83 , and the overall dynamism of the GATS negotiations indicate that improvements with respect to cross-border GATS commitments (mode 1 and mode 2) are to be expected. The situation for negotiations on audiovisual services -one of the three fields of great relevance to digital products -is less clear. 84 On the one hand, the technological evolutions, the new interest of developing countries in market access for digital products (India, Brazil, etc.) 85 , the notion that trade rules may be sufficiently flexible to address all aspects of the audiovisual sector, and the sustained interest of the U.S. have certainly introduced new components to the debate. These new components have been reflected in four very innovative sectoral proposals 86 and in a significant number of GATS requests in the field that decrease the likelihood that the audiovisual service negotiations will be paralyzed from the beginning on because of a open transatlantic confrontation. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that out of a desire to preserve their cultural sectors very few WTO Member States made commitments in audiovisual services during the Uruguay Round.
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Although it is difficult to forecast how many WTO Member States will try to maintain their practice of not scheduling the audiovisual sector, the resistance of many WTO Member States will be fierce. Especially very influential countries like the EC, Canada and Australia -the hardliners on cultural exemption from trade integrationhave so far rejected any audiovisual discussion during the ongoing GATS negotiations and made it very clear that no offers will be made for the cultural service sectors and that no classification of digital products under the GATT will be accepted. 89 In the case of the EC both the mandate given by the EC Member States and the fact that each EC Member States can block any offer in this field leaves no flexibility to the EC negotiators to make just any concession.
90
Under the new header of "diversité culturelle" rather than "exception culturelle", especially the French-Canadian and the other abovementioned WTO Member States are currently trying to push the issue of audiovisual service liberalization -and therefore also the issue of the trade of some digital products -outside the WTO (mostly to the UNESCO 91 ), and to build an international instrument on cultural diversity that recognizes the importance of all cultural support measures.
92 If a GATS classification for digital products prevails, the absence of market access commitments in the audiovisual field will mean that the least trade liberal approach to digital products has been chosen. Recent EC proposals to exclude any software or computer services with audiovisual content (like entertainment games) from the very liberal commitments on computer services would even extend this approach.
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Currently, it seems that the fate of further audiovisual service liberalization in the WTO crucially depends on whether either the U.S. or the Canada-EC tandem can manage to gather a majority of WTO Member States on their respective side. The fact that the request-offer process is bilateral and not public will, however, enable the U.S. to approach trading partners individually before the topic of audiovisual service negotiations attracts more spotlight in the overall negotiations.
(iii) At this point in time a proposal to modernize the TRIPS for the digital age -and hence to extend its current rules and obligations -is a non-starter at the WTO level. In fact, any such proposal would be seriously out of step with what is currently acceptable to the majority of the WTO Member States. Many developing countries still doubt if their TRIPS accession during the Uruguay Round was a beneficial move to begin with. Actually many also struggle with the enforcement of current TRIPS obligations. Such a proposal would also be out of step with the current TRIPS negotiations that -in accordance with the "Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health" -rather deal with setting limits to the applicability of the current TRIPS obligations under certain conditions than with discussing more demanding IPR protection. 95 Although technically speaking the mandated "Review of TRIPS Provisions" could be used to introduce extensions of the TRIPS, neither the U.S. nor any other industrialized nation have yet seriously addressed this aspect of the digital All in all, parts of the U.S. objectives with respect to greater market access for goods and services are likely to be achieved, 98 whereas most of its objectives specifically targeted to digital trade and in particular digital products, and its objectives with respect to intellectual property rights will not be pursued directly in the WTO. 99 Of course, due to the single undertaking approach of the Doha Development Agenda even the limited potential achievements in the current market access negotiations depend on the successful conclusion of the ongoing multilateral trade round. 100 Seen from a mercantilistic perspective that dominates trade negotiatons, especially the developing countries have no reason to be enthusiastic about digital trade rules if industrialized countries refuse to apply free trade principles to their limited export portfolio that often only consists of agricultural products.
First Successes of U.S. Digital Trade Policy on the Bilateral
Front, and More to Come …
The situation with respect to the successful implementation of the U.S. digital trade agenda looks quite different if one considers the two first preferential trade agreements concluded among the flurry of planned U.S.-driven bilateral and regional FTAs. Similarly as for other TPA negotiation objectives that will be hard to implement on the multilateral stage (i.e. the inclusion of labor and environmental standards), both the U.S. breaking and similar precedents for future U.S. and other digital trade objectives in trade agreements. 102 Specifically, most of the U.S. digital trade objectives with respect to the section on Trade in IT Goods in Table 1 were satisfied from the start because Chile and Singapore are members to the ITA. In addition, both agreements now specify that for digital products delivered on physical carrier media customs duties will be assessed on the value of the media.
When it comes to trade in services, both U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore follow the U.S. negotiation objectives in Table 1 and use the most liberal form to schedule trade commitments (the negative list approach).
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Basically the most-favored nation approach (MFN), market access, and national treatment must be granted to all services provided on a crossborder basis if limitations to these principles are not specifically scheduled.
104 This top-down approach guarantees that narrow classification schemes (i.e. the classification of entertainment games under audiovisual vs. computer services) do not limit the applicability of commitments to digital products or electronic services 105 and that new services are automatically covered by past commitments. The parties to the two agreements thus have accorded significant market access across their entire service regime, and have listed only very few exceptions. In line with Table 1 the commitments cover the cross-border trade in computer and in other business services. Special efforts have been made to liberalize the cross-border supply of telecommunication, financial and professional services. In its e-commerce chapter, the agreement with Singapore even affirms that commitments related to services also extend to their electronic delivery.
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102 As both trade agreements were not yet public at the time of writing, the information given below is taken from publicly available information like the USTR fact sheets on the FTA with Chile and the FTA with Singapore in USTR (2003a USTR ( , 2003b , from GOBIERNO DE CHILE (2003), from press reports, or it is taken from personal discussions. See also "Officials Tout Manufacturing, Services Benefits From U.S.-Singapore FTA", Inside U.S. Trade, January 31, 2003 . 103 See STEPHENSON (2002 who outlines that many service trade agreements in the Western hemisphere have used the negative list approach. This article also provides other details on service trade agreements that were previously concluded in the Americas.
When it comes to audiovisual services, both Chile and Singapore have accepted to dismiss the notion of a fully-fledged "exception culturelle". Both have agreed to make specific commitments on their audiovisual service sector while -in line with the U.S. requests on audiovisual services -retaining room of maneuver in order to maintain central elements of existing and, in some cases like subsidies, future cultural policies.
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Instead of maintaining full policy flexibility with respect to audiovisual services, the two U.S. trade partners both agreed to schedule and thereby freeze their existing discriminatory regulations applicable to audiovisual services. Chile, for instance, has only listed a few limitations: a ceiling to its national broadcast quota at 40%, some nationality requirements for important positions in the Chilean media, limitations on radio licenses when the invested foreign capital exceeds a certain percentage, etc. 107 As no discriminatory regulations currently exist for new media the Chileans thus agreed to full market access and national treatment obligations for all audiovisual services transmitted by these new electronic delivery modes. 108 At the same time, the Chileans scheduled limitations that guarantee that any current or future financial support scheme for Chilean culture can be maintained. Moreover, the Chileans formally preserved their right to conclude any international cultural cooperation agreement. 109 In sum, especially the FTA with Chile can be considered as a test-bed for the new U.S. approach to trade liberalization of audiovisual services.
The greatest innovation of the two new bilateral FTAs of the U.S. are, however, their inclusion of legally binding and very similar e-commerce chapters and their precedent-setting provisions about the protection of copyright in the digital age.
110 Thus, as opposed to the multilateral level that has no particular official digital trade talks, these bilateral deals were reached through special "e-commerce negotiations" and negotiations on the updating of IPRs to the digital age.
Both agreements recognize that e-commerce is an important means of trade and that new trade barriers to digital trade -including e-commerce regulations that are more burdensome than necessary -should be avoided. Specifically, the parties agree to a permanent duty-free moratorium on e-commerce. The first e-commerce chapters ever to be legally integrated into FTAs also guarantee national treatment on the basis of MFN to a comprehensive set of digital products (video, any kind of software, etc). Again a top-down approach is pursued. Although in the U.S.-Chile agreement, for instance, the contracting parties have one year to list existing non-conforming measures to these obligations, 111 outside of these limitations the principle of non-discrimination applies to all digital products delivered electronically.
Interestingly, the latter digital products need not be fully created and exported via one of the contracting parties to benefit from these principles. The e-commerce chapters indicate that they must only transit through or be created, altered, or published on the territory of either contracting party, or be created by a citizen of either contracting party to benefit from this most trade liberal treatment. In effect, this means that digital products from other countries can benefit from the obligations under the bilateral U.S.-Chile FTA if their products are, for example, routed over or transformed in Chile before they are send to the U.S.
112 Moreover, the rules and obligations on e-commerce apply horizontally without introducing a distinction between goods and services. Finally, when it comes to intellectual property protection for the digital age, both bilateral trade agreements are very similar in securing significantly improved protection for digital products and its enforcement. In line with Table 1 Chile and Singapore have both agreed to adopt sophisticated copyright and trademark protection. Many of the provisions are based on principles agreed upon in the WIPO Internet treaties that protect online works. But they go much further in addressing respective country-specific improvements of the IPR protection (e.g. Singapore prohibits the production of optical discs without a source identification code unless authorized 113 ), in adopting some standards that reflect U.S. internal IPR legislation from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (i.e. parts on the limited liability for Internet Service Providers in U.S.-Chile) and including additional obligations (e.g. the commitment of governments in the U.S. and Chile to use only legitimate software). The agreements also include provisions on the use of trademarks on the Internet. 114 Most importantly, these changes in IPR law are proof that the U.S. is successful in using bilateral agreements to reach through and trigger profound changes in not necessarily trade-related domestic Singaporian law 115 .
A comparison of above treaty elements with the Association Agreement between Chile and the EC that entered into force in December 2002 reinforces the impression that the U.S. agreement includes far-reaching and novel digital trade rules and obligations. 116 The trade in service commitments in most service sectors -especially in the field of telecommunications and financial services 117 -are rather similar between the EC-Chile and the U.S.-Chile FTAs. Moreover, the EC-Chile Association Agreement also includes obligations on the adoption of the new WIPO Internet has not yet passed the implementing legislation for the TRIPS agreement that it has signed nearly eight years ago. In addition, the enforcement of any new IPRs will be a great challenge to all contracting parties, including the U.S. 115 A very similar influence of the US on foreign domestic law in "trade and …"-issues will be seen with respect to environmental and labor standards. treaties and therefore goes nearly as far as the U.S.-Chile Agreement 118 . However, the EC-Chile Agreement uses the less trade liberal positive list approach to schedule service commitments. While making pledges to reinforce cultural cooperation 119 , cultural services are excluded from the chapter on trade matters 120 . Instead of agreeing on a comprehensive ecommerce chapter analogous to the U.S., the Association Agreement only includes a pledge for cooperation in e-commerce matters that has no specific content-related implications 121 and parts that explicitly address data protection and consumer protection 122 .
But now that the U.S. industry's expectations are high, the U.S. agreements on digital trade with Singapore and Chile are just the start when it comes to the U.S. digital trade ambitions. What the U.S.
has not yet achieved on digital trade multilaterally, it now plans to seed in a tight net of gradually increasing bilateral agreements that are negotiated sequentially.
123 When looking at the IPR and e-commerce requests it becomes particularly clear that many elements of the U.S. digital trade agenda are a mere transposition of domestic regulatory approaches to trading partners. Undoubtedly, the above-mentioned rules and obligations on digital trade will now set important precedents for all other prospective preferential trade deals. Of course, an important element of this strategy was to take two rather easy negotiation partners to start with. Both Chile and Singapore are very open-trade minded U.S. trading partners that signed the WIPO treaties 124 , they both have longed for a FTA with the U.S. for some time now 125 and -in terms of economic size -they are very unequal bargaining partners. Therefore, the U.S. negotiators managed to set high benchmarks with respect to digital trade but also with respect to other TPA objectives (i.e. the reference to environmental and labor standards) that will be difficult to achieve on the multilateral level. These now serve as high initial benchmarks for following negotiations.
Accordingly, the readiness of potential FTA partners to include aspects crucial to U.S. interests like intellectual property protections and e-commerce provisions will now be key criteria in the selection of further U.S. bilateral FTA partners. 126 Indeed, the USTR has already announced that the objectives of Table 1 will also be aimed for in the bilateral negotiations that are ongoing or still lie ahead this year (CAFTA, SACU, Morocco and others mentioned in the introduction). 127 To conclude, these two agreements and the ensuing web of bilateral agreements also have a regional dimension. Singapore must be seen as blueprint for further agreements in the Asian region that will follow by the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative. Actually, shortly before the conclusion of the FTA with Singapore, the U.S. has already prepared the ground for later legally binding digital trade obligations through the work with 16 Asian countries on an "APEC Understanding on Trade and the Digital Economy". 128 Although this Understanding only entails exerted language on the many specific issues addressed (general objective of trade policy targets for the digital economy and objectives on services, intellectual property, tariffs, etc. ) its importance as first important step to more serious trade obligations should not be underestimated.
Finally, the agreement with Chile and the forthcoming agreement with CAFTA must be seen as first initial steps to anchor these trade principles in the FTAA negotiations. 129 The current FTAA negotiations already made some important steps towards these goals. On the one hand, it is fairly certain that the top-down ("negative list") approach will be used for the FTAA services chapter. 130 On the other hand, since their very start the FTAA negotiations are accompanied by a government -private sector committee that addresses even more wide-ranging digital trade topics than described in Table 1 probable it is that the new U.S. strategy that follows a bottom-up approach (from bilateral to higher levels) will be successful. The author would like to conclude by addressing these two questions.
Concerning the first question of whether the bilateral U.S. digital trade agreements are a "building or a stumbling block" to the WTO, it is fairly safe to exclude the stumbling block hypothesis. Traditionally, preferential trade agreements are seen with suspicion by the economics profession due to ensuing trade diversion effects and vested interests ("the insiders") that have an interest of excluding non-members from the advantages of preferential trade deals. 133 It can be argued that these well-known systemic concerns vis-à-vis preferential trade agreements are not warranted with respect to elements of the U.S. digital trade agenda.
Indeed, that is because the pursuit of the U.S. digital trade agenda in preferential trade deals is part of a concurrent strategy that envisages as its final goal the establishment of free digital trade on the global level. To stop short at the conclusion of a few bilateral FTAs is not the intention of the U.S. for two reasons. First, the U.S. knows that a scattered set of bilateral agreements is not satisfactory to do justice to trade conducted via global electronic media. On the practical front, it is also simply impossible to negotiate heterogeneous trade agreements on e-commerce, IPRs, and the like bilaterally with 145 WTO Member States. Second, both the U.S. industry and the U.S. negotiators know that especially with respect to digital trade flows Chile, Singapore, SACU, etc. themselves are still fairly unimportant economies. 134 The greatest digital trade flows are obviously with trade partners like the EC and Japan that the U.S. is unlikely to sign FTAs with in the near future.
All these arguments reinforce the impression that the U.S. perceives these bilateral agreements as a building block to subsequent negotiations and that it regards their strategic value as high initial benchmarks. 135 Seen from this perspective an unprecedented phenomenon of a more direct causal interdependence between bilateral FTAs and regional or multi-lateral negotiations comes into play. The digital trade negotiations on the bilateral front simply help the U.S. to build coalitions of like-minded trade partners that -in turn -will make it easier to converge to a consensus that strongly resembles the U.S. approach on the regional or even the multilateral level.
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This use of lower level trade fora to achieve consensus on higher levels must be seen in the context of the particular nature of digital trade objectives. Clearly, the adoption of an e-commerce chapter, the agreement to keep new media free of cultural exemptions, and an updated IPR regime are very different from negotiations on tariff reductions. These negotiations can be seen as a struggle of different WTO Member States to establish their regulatory approach ("liberalization blueprint") to digital trade and IPRs in a multilateral setting 137 , and as a way to pioneer issues within a setting where agreement is more easily reached. Both the legal language used and its subsequent implementation on the bilateral or regional level can also act as a much more flexible test-bed and laboratory for more important trade agreements that in turn may increase the likelihood of agreement in the WTO. 138 If one assumes that the agreement on U.S. digital trade objectives is desirable on the WTO level, this means that non-members of the current U.S. preferential trade deals also benefit from the U.S. negotiation efforts that overcome logjams in the WTO. In the jargon of the regionalism debate, these preferential trade deals are thus "friends" to the WTO. 139 Moreover, it can be argued that the trade diversion costs of this move on parallel tracks are low and that via an erga omnes effect non-members to the preferential trade deals also benefit from these advances on U.S. digital trade objectives. 140 The fact that trade diversion costs are low has to do with the fact that, in principle, the new rules and obligations are applicable to future rather than current electronic trade flows.
141 Nevertheless, the threat to outsiders The Association Agreements of the EC, for instance, also set an interesting precedent of excluding audiovisual services from trade agreements. 138 One can also think of these treaty elements as "modules" that technically still are so close to the WTO Treaties that WTO Member States can resort to them at a later stage. See MATTOO and FINK (2002) p. 3 for points on why for service trade agreements more efficient bargaining may be possible in the plurilateral context. 139 See BHAGWATI and PANAGARIYA (1999) for the categorization of preferential trade agreements in "strangers, friends and foes" to multilateralism. 140 The author would like to thank GEORG KOOPMANN and CATHERINE MANN for very helpful conceptual discussions on the latter point. 141 Consequently, no trade diversion takes place. that they may not be significant players in future electronic trade flows puts pressure on them to join similar trade arrangements.
142 Trade diversion costs are also low as the elimination of non-tariff trade barriers does not involve a loss of tariff revenues. 143 The argument that -via an erga omnes effect -non-members also profit from current U.S. FTAs is also a new one to the regionalism vs. multilateralism debate. Accordingly, non-members to the U.S. FTAs can -in addition to profiting from a liberalization blueprint for the multilateral levelactually free-ride on the reciprocal commitments made between the U.S. and its trading partners. This holds true despite of the fact that the digital trade rules and obligations are not extended de iure to third parties. This argument is again tightly linked to the nature of digital trade rules and obligations mentioned in Table 1 . These objectives will often trigger domestic laws or changes in existing legislations that will then indiscriminately affect other trading nations in a positive way.
144 Once these changes have been decided upon, they are automatically or easily extendable to third parties. That is because either the trade concessions are not easily confined to the partners of the bilateral trade agreement, or because once principals have settled certain questions politically (e.g., "should the cultural exemption be maintained for all media?"; "should IPRs be protected in an online environment?"), they are also more acceptable on a broader scale.
If, for instance, Chile pledges to avoid domestic e-commerce regulations that are unnecessarily harmful to trade in the FTA with the U.S. this will also benefit other trading partners. The same logic applies to the adoption of sophisticated IPR regimes. Once a U.S. trading partner ratifies and implements the two new WIPO treaties, copyright holders of other trading nations are also better off. If Chile agrees bilaterally to avoid erecting trade barriers with respect to new content delivery technologies (e.g., video-ondemand over the Internet, etc.) or if Chile agrees to freeze its current audiovisual regulations, then third trading nations are also likely to benefit from these (preventive) changes of domestic law. Clearly, it is also very likely that Chile will not treat digital content from the U.S. in a different manner than digital content from the EC. Even the 40% local content quota for public broadcasters, for instance, that Chile has established as an upper limitation on its audiovisual policy will probably apply to all foreign content producers. All in all, these examples show that with respect to digital trade objectives bilateral agreements can have a positive effect on third countries.
Concerning the second question of how probable it is that the new U.S. strategy will be successful, the assessment is less clear-cut. To begin with, it is very likely that in the next bilateral negotiations with Morocco and SACU, for example, the U.S. may successfully use its much greater bargaining power to continue achieving the whole spectrum of its digital trade objectives listed in Table 1 . With respect to traditional topics like the free trade in IT goods and more service liberalization in fields like computer services, the bilateral U.S. strategy will produce much more trade openness from developing countries. The strategy will certainly also succeed in the fostering of a common approach to e-commerce and modernized IPR protection among a large number of countries that will be approached to conclude a FTA (especially from Asia, Central America, and Africa). Undoubtedly, this parallel track of negotiations will produce results that through the multilateral negotiations alone would have been impossible or would have occurred much later.
But it is uncertain if the U.S. bottom-up approach (from success on the bilateral level to success on the regional or global level) will work all the way through. Very soon the U.S. may start to feel the limits of their concurrent negotiation approach and their attempt to build large like-minded coalitions. The U.S. strategy of coalition building around their "liberalization blueprint" will only work if all bilateral FTAs approach the digital trade issues in a rather homogeneous manner. Clearly, the value of many heterogeneous bilateral agreements on digital trade issues with economically unimportant trade partners and no subsequent building block effect would be rather low. But considering the diversity of countries that the U.S. must bring on board and considering also that the U.S. has started with the "easy" negotiations, it will be difficult to maintain this comprehensive list of negotiation objectives. When the U.S. starts approaching partners for preferential trade agreements that are economically more important and that are also very inclined to rank "cultural diversity" high on their agenda the U.S. negotiators will face the same problems as in the WTO (see Part 3). In particular the FTA with Australia and the negotiations with Canada in the context of the FTAA will force the U.S. to make first amendments to their liberalization blueprint as both countries are unlikely to make concessions on cultural services (including digital products). 145 This and a lower willingness of these countries towards a regulatory e-commerce discipline will in turn make it very difficult to reach most of the U.S. objectives vis-à-vis an e-commerce chapter. In the end, the U.S. coalition building for solutions on the WTO-level with respect to this aspect may thus be less successful than intended.
With respect to other elements, however, (i.e. IPR protection, service liberalization, and general awareness of free digital trade) the U.S. multitrack initiative for digital trade remains a very promising undertaking that may also foreshadow how majorities can be found among an increasingly heterogeneous WTO membership and how "regulatory best practices" are promulgated via trade agreements.
